“On February 28, 2022, I met with the U.S. Ambassador at the Parliament building. According to her, this was a critical moment when we had to decide whether we were ‘on the light side or the dark side,’ which should primarily be demonstrated by joining sanctions against Russia,” wrote Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili on his Facebook page.

As Papuashvili elaborated, his post addresses Georgia’s strategic alliance with the West, including related expectations, mistakes, and disappointments.

“On the morning of February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation attacked Ukraine, shattering the faint hope that this war would not begin. As we recall, this invasion followed several months of escalating tension. Once the war commenced, the West naturally condemned Russian aggression and approved the first package of sanctions on February 23-24. However, on February 25, Georgia’s Prime Minister ruled out joining the Western sanctions against Russia. This refusal — which, in hindsight, has proven reasonable and justified — initially garnered negative reactions from certain Western governments, the Georgian radical opposition, and affiliated non-governmental organizations. The opposition and NGOs rapidly launched a fierce campaign against the government, branding it a ‘pro-Russian government.’ Anti-government protests erupted outside the Parliament. It is evident that among Western nations, the United States holds significant influence in Georgia, given our strategic partnership, historical ties, and areas of cooperation. At the time, U.S. Ambassador Kelly Degnan was not in Georgia but returned shortly after the war began and requested a meeting with me while still in the U.S.

On February 28, 2022, I met with her and her staff at the Parliament building. She began by expressing the ‘confusion and disappointment’ felt by her government regarding the Georgian Prime Minister’s decision and statement on February 25. According to her, this was the moment to choose whether we were ‘on the light side or the dark side,’ which should be primarily expressed by joining sanctions against Russia. The Ambassador emphasized this demand, while her special assistant meticulously recorded my responses. At that time, the extent and outcome of the newly commenced war remained unclear.

I responded, “Georgia, which has not been consulted by anyone regarding the specifics, duration, or any aspect of the sanctions against Russia, cannot sign such a blank check.”

I added, “It is unknown what consequences such a sharp demarche would bring to Georgia, what retaliatory strike we might face, and what risks we would incur. As a specific country, with Russian troops on our territory, we must exercise caution. We are neither a NATO nor EU member; therefore, we do not enjoy NATO’s nuclear protection or the EU’s economic mutual assistance obligation.”

Alongside this unequivocal position, I also informed the Ambassador that the Georgian government had already taken steps, even within the banking sector, to preclude circumventing sanctions. I noted that on the international stage, Georgia aligned itself with Ukraine in discussions and votes in any format, but the U.S. Ambassador remained categorical and unyielding. The only response she sought was an agreement to impose sanctions. Each time she returned to the question of whether we would join the sanctions, her assistant would take note of my refusals.

Time would later confirm that the sanctions policy was determined through negotiations among Western countries, where each sought to tailor sanctions to their respective interests. Notably, interests such as the energy sector were largely exempted from sanctions. Throughout the war, Russian gas continued to flow to Europe via Ukraine. Lithuania even became a leading wine exporter to Russia, despite not producing any wine itself.

I also conveyed to the American Ambassador that what Ukraine needed at that moment was not sanctions, but military assistance — troops, weapons, and defence systems. We see President Zelenskyy requesting the Georgian government to send fighters, and perhaps the U.S. should consider this. In response, she immediately asked, “Do you want a nuclear war to start?” I replied, “You see, you exercise caution, but you disapprove of our caution. In reality, given the current situation, an escalation and potential war for us is equivalent to a nuclear conflict.”

Following our conversation, the Ambassador rushed to the State Chancellery to speak with the Prime Minister. My conversation with her, as the Speaker of the legislative body elected two months earlier, was presumably just a preliminary step, while her discussion with the Prime Minister was likely much more extensive and direct regarding the issue of imposing or not imposing economic sanctions,” Papuashvili writes.

Papuashvili continues, “All of the Ambassador’s attempts were unsuccessful, and the Georgian government declined to engage in reckless and unreasonable escalation.”

“I am unsure how much of a coincidence it is, but the day after these significant conversations, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy recalled his ambassador from Georgia, citing this reason—an action that further inflamed the situation and added fuel to the fire of ongoing anti-government protests in Tbilisi. Concurrently with the tightening of anti-Russian sanctions, a well-coordinated campaign commenced to accuse the Georgian government of circumventing said sanctions. Representatives from foreign governments, European Parliament deputies, radical opposition members, and their allied NGOs actively participated in this campaign, using allegations to exert constant pressure on the government.

It took us nearly two years to gain official acknowledgement through a high-ranking delegation visit to Georgia, which included sanctions coordinators from the U.S., UK, and European Union, that Georgia had never violated the sanctions regime. However, for two years, the Georgian government had to endure unfounded and malicious attacks aimed at damaging its reputation. Ultimately, the opponents also benefited as reputational accusations circulated through controlled media and yielded corresponding results.

Nevertheless, Georgia’s decision to abstain from joining the sanctions, thus minimizing security risks, was informed by several reasons that we, as a responsible government, comprehended far better than harmful opposition:

First, we were not involved in the processes through which the sanctions policy was determined and adopted. Consequently, we could not accept sanctions agreed upon by others without considering our national interests, the price we would bear, and the potential responses we would face.

Second, imposing sanctions on Russia would revive open conflict, likely provoking retaliatory actions that could cause a collapse of Georgia’s economy.

Third, any military escalation could lead to a level of destruction and devastation akin to what we have witnessed over the last three years in eastern Ukraine, where we can clearly see the threats to our statehood, territorial integrity, and sovereignty being discussed in relation to ending the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Finally, signing a carte blanche is typically expected from weak and subjugated countries, not from friends and partners, as we consider ourselves to be. What frustrated some was the realization that Georgia, in fact, possesses its own national interests and is prepared to fight to defend them (and, by the way, we are currently observing the struggle of national interests on the world stage).

Last spring, I recounted this story to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Jim O’Brien, during his visit to Georgia. I posed one question to him: Is this how strategic partners should behave? The only response I received was that, at the time, all ambassadors were instructed to engage countries as much as possible in the established policy against Russia, and it may not have been right that Georgia’s unique situation and potential consequences were not taken into account. “Yes, you recognize this now, over two years into the war,” I replied, “but what would have happened if we had blindly followed without any guarantees or security precautions? Where would we find ourselves? Whose tank would be standing outside?” There was silence in response.

The moral of this story is that, in a difficult situation during a genuine crisis, no one will fulfil your needs but yourself. You must bear all the risks and responsibilities, and if you fall into a pit, you may ultimately be left with nothing but feelings of regret, concern, and sympathy.

In light of the emergence of a dangerous regional conflict or other threats, Georgia had anticipated that its Western strategic partners would support and protect us. Instead, some actually urged us to confront Russia and exacerbated internal disorder within our country.

Before the war began, given the threat posed by Russia, the West counselled us toward ‘strategic patience,’ urging us to remain withdrawn and to avoid confrontation with Russia. However, when the threat became imminent, they encouraged thoughtless escalation instead of exercising more caution.

We value our strategic alliance but understand that such alliances should not merely exploit each other; they must rely on mutual respect and the consideration of one another’s national interests.

Fortunately, we demonstrated foresight in time. Today, three years later, this lesson is evident to all, except for the desperate proponents of ‘pseudo-liberal internationalism,’ who fail to learn from either their own experiences or those of others,” writes Shalva Papuashvili.