The Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) has announced that the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has begun substantive examination of the case concerning the so-called Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

As GYLA’s Chairwoman, Tamar Oniani, stated at a press conference today, the GYLA brought a challenge against the law before the Strasbourg Court in 2025 on behalf of six applicants.

“As the public will recall, exactly one year ago today, on April 1, 2025, Georgian Dream adopted the Foreign Agents Registration Act, so-called FARA, a law that violates the Georgian Constitution and Georgia’s international human rights obligations, and whose purpose is to silence, discredit, and persecute independent civil society and the media, including through the imposition of criminal liability.

On March 31, 2026, in a communication received from the European Court of Human Rights, the Court indicated that it has opened proceedings in the case that GYLA brought before the Strasbourg Court in 2025 on behalf of six applicants, namely, three organisations (the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association and two media organisations: Studio Monitor and Georgia Today), and three individuals (the heads of the applicant organisations: Nona Kurdovanidze, Nino Zuriashvili, and Gela Mtivlishvili).

Georgian Dream regards this law as the equivalent of the American FARA, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, yet in reality, the American FARA is a piece of legislation dating from 1938 which, in its historical context and as interpreted by the United States Department of Justice and its independent courts, is designed not to restrict independent civil society and media organisations but to expose the activities of agents acting on behalf of hostile foreign powers. Furthermore, that legislation applies to situations in which foreign-funded individuals do not act autonomously but are entirely subordinate to the directions of a principal. Georgian society must understand that the substance of a law is not determined solely by its text, and that the direct transplantation of legislation from one country to another cannot guarantee identical operation. A legal norm that may share identical wording can, in different jurisdictions and at different times, produce entirely different outcomes, depending on the structure of the legal system, the political environment, and institutional mechanisms,” Tamar Oniani stated.

According to Oniani, GYLA argues in its application that the Foreign Agents Registration Act adopted by Georgian Dream violates the following rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights:

“Article 11 (freedom of association); Article 10 (freedom of expression); Article 13 (right to an effective remedy); Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination); and Article 18 (limitation on use of restrictions on rights).

The Court has accepted the case concerning all the articles, and its correspondence suggests that it may designate the case as one of significant impact. This means the Strasbourg Court will examine the case on a priority basis, as it concerns a legal problem of fundamental importance, and the judgment handed down will constitute a precedent not only for Georgia but for all member states of the Council of Europe.
The application sets out the argument that, alongside vague and ambiguous provisions, the bodies responsible for enforcing the law, formerly the Anti-Corruption Bureau, now its successor, the Audit Service, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the courts, have been granted disproportionate powers, which increases the risk of arbitrary application of the law. There is also a considerable chilling effect that the mere expectation of such enforcement may produce on those subject to it.

By way of procedural clarification: in opening substantive examination, the Court has posed a series of questions to which the state will first be required to respond. Of particular note is the Court’s indication that it is necessary to assess whether the state applied restrictions on rights covertly for other, ulterior, non-Convention purposes, specifically, whether the real and dominant purpose behind the restrictions was some hidden intention, such as political retribution and/or the suppression of critical voices, which would be incompatible with the Convention from the outset.

The questions posed are as follows:
Victim status — can the applicants claim victim status by virtue of the operation of the law (Article 34 of the Convention)? In particular, have any of the law’s provisions been applied to them?
Right to privacy — do the obligations imposed by law to submit and label personal data constitute interference with the rights of individual applicants? If so, was that interference compatible with the requirements of Article 8(2) of the Convention?
Freedom of expression and association — has the operation of the law (including its obligations regarding registration, reporting, disclosure, labelling, and document retention) violated the applicants’ rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention? If so, was that interference compatible with the second paragraphs of those articles?
Stigmatisation — does the designation of organisations as ‘agents of a foreign principal’ carry a stigmatising effect, having regard to the specific linguistic nuances of the Georgian language? Does the term have a significant deterrent effect on the organisation’s activities? What objective evidence, public opinion surveys, and linguistic expert opinions exist to support the proposition that this designation carries a stigmatised connotation in the Georgian language?
‘Foreign force’ and ‘agency relationship’ — does the definition of ‘foreign principal’ satisfy the requirements of necessity, relevance, and adequate justification? Does the law define with sufficient clarity the ‘agency relationship’ between a ‘foreign force’ and a domestic ‘agent’ to preclude broad and potentially abusive interpretations?
Proportionality of sanctions — are the sanctions imposed for breaches of the law proportionate to the gravity of the conduct concerned? Discrimination — does the operation of the law constitute discriminatory treatment of the applicants (Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Articles 8, 10, and 11)?
Effective remedy — did the applicants have access to effective domestic remedies for the protection of their rights (Article 13 of the Convention)? Restrictions imposed for ulterior purposes — did the State apply restrictions on the rights guaranteed by Articles 8, 10, and 11 of the Convention for purposes other than those prescribed by those articles (Article 18 of the Convention)?” Tamar Oniani stated at the press conference.

The GYLA Chairwoman further noted that the State has been given until July 21, 2026, to submit its position to the Court.

“Following that, in accordance with procedure, the applicant party will submit its written response. We would also remind the public that the European Court of Human Rights has already, in effect, concluded its examination of the joint application brought by some 136 organisations and four individuals in connection with the so-called Russian law, the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence (see Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association and Others v. Georgia, no. 31069/24). GYLA, as representative of the applicants, will keep the public informed with updates as the proceedings develop,” Tamar Oniani stated.